not hope to make the contribution that otherwise would be within our power.

I shall not add much to what the distinguished Senator from Illinois has already stated about the importance of strengthening the ties between the United States and Japan. I was in Japan about a year and a half ago, and I, too, appreciate the tremendous contribution which that country is making toward the extension of a democratic way of life in Asia, and the added strength that is thus given to our determination and our convictions in all of the Orient.

Certainly newsprint is an important commodity, one that is becoming more important as time goes on. I, too, come from a State which has some timber stands. Because I do, I would say to those from the East who are not as aware of the fact as some of us are that with the ravages of insect disease, the problem with timber is not simply a matter of storing or keeping a resource for use at some future time. Timber has a lifespan; it has a life cycle; it grows up. If it is not used at the time when it becomes ripe, it is often felled by insect diseases, and it can be scourged by the ravages of fire.

That fact lends a special importance to the wise observations made by the junior Senator from Oregon as to taking advantage now of the opportunity to institute a national program that will contemplate the use of these resources on a sustained yield basis, and which would permit the great capability of the State of Oregon and other States in the Pacific Northwest to utilize better this important renewable resource.

As we do that, as we make more jobs available, and as we add to the income, to the industry, to the prosperity, and to the tax base of the States in the Pacific Northwest, we will contribute to the strength of America and make possible places for Americans to find homes where the air is clear and the streams are clean, and we do not have all of the problems that exist in some of our metropolitan areas.

What the Senator from Oregon has said this morning is of great importance. I compliment him for his keen understanding of the many ramifications of the problem, and I urge that the Senate heed and consider carefully the important message he has given us.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I wish to express my appreciation to the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HANSEN] for his comments and observations. I had the privilege to serve with him as a fellow Governor and am completely aware of his great leadership in the area of natural resource development. I am proud to sit with him now in the back row of the U.S. Senate.

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, I join my fellow Senators in commending the junior Senator from Oregon. Although I did not have the privilege of being present when he made his remarks, I did hear the statements by the junior Senator from Illinois and the junior Senator from Wyoming in relationship to his remarks. I know of his great ability, how articulate he is in expressing himself, and how dedicated he is to his State of Oregon. My State, too, is vitally interested in the problem to which he referred; so I shall be eager to read his statement. I again congratulate him for his outstanding services to his State and to the Nation.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HATFIELD. I am happy to yield.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I am pleased to commend the distinguished junior Senator from Oregon for his timely and informative remarks concerning the crisis confronting the timber industry in the State of Oregon and in the western part of our Nation.

I sincerely trust that we in the Senate will join with Senator HATFIELD in requesting an early meeting of United States and Japanese Governments and industry officials to review all aspects of the log export issue with a view to uniting the effort needed for remedial action.

Senator HATFIELD is to be congratulated for bringing this important matter to the attention of the Senate.

Mr. HATFIELD. I thank the Senator.

THE ABM—DET US BEGIN

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, years from now when historians sit down to write a treatise on the 90th Congress they doubtless will emphasize its concern with foreign policy and military affairs. For this Congress, more so than most other Congresses, it seems to me, has focused its attention on efforts to secure and construst a meaningful peace in the world.

Admittedly, our efforts to secure man's oldest dream, his natural right to be his own master, have been strikingly dissimilar. On one hand, we have substantially increased military aid to South Vietnam, a small Asian nation struggling for the right to determine its own destiny. And at the same time, we have entered into another agreement with the nation that, by deed no less than word, is our principle adversary; and we have done so in the hope that it might somehow be a step toward peace.

Needless to say, these were not easy decisions to make, either for the President or for Congress. Nor were they unanimously made. They involved complex and interrelated problems and men of good will supported each side of both issues, as they do even today.

Some years ago Yale classicist Richmond Lattimore observed that the essence of Greek tragedy is not that it is between good and bad, but that it is between good and good—an observation that applies equally well to the present situation. No one knows with certainty that his choice is necessarily correct, for wisdom and truth and right are rarely 100 percent on one side. But the decisions have to be made, and—differ though we do—we make them.

It is important, Mr. President, that we remind the world that our differences never reflect a fundamental disagreement on the basic issue of peace. That matter is never contested. There is no one amoung us who does not desire the cessation of hostilities, not only in Vietnam, but also throughout the world. There is no one in this Chamber who does not pray for better relations among all nations. Nor is there a responsible American who does not long to curb the worldwide aggressiveness of what Edmund Burke, in another age, described as an armed doctrine.

But, as Professor Lattimore suggested, the choice open to us is not clear, neither black nor white. And those who view these decisions in terms of "war or peace" or "Red or dead" or "hawk or dove" do a great disservice to the Nation.

But still the euphemisms are hurled about carelessly, often maliciously.

This dilemma can best be illustrated in the present controversy of whether the United States should proceed to install an antiballistic missile—ABM—system. To some, principally spokesmen for the administration, the deployment of such a network, even though it is purely defensive in design, is viewed as a needless escalation of the nuclear arms race. To others, including many military experts, some of whom are Members of this body, the ABM system is viewed as the best deterrent to a nuclear war. Surely, no one can say with assurance that those who support the second proposition are less concerned with peace than those who support the first; neither can one logically argue that those who endorse the initial proposition are less concerned with national defense than are those who support the second. The issue is not that deducible.

Personally, although I am neither a military expert nor a scientist, I am convinced of the superiority of the second argument: that the United States must undertake immediately to develop and deploy an effective antiballistic missile system.

I take this position for two reasons. First, according to intelligence reports, Soviet Russia is already beginning to deploy a defense system designed to protect its major cities against attack by intercontinental ballistic missiles. And, second, increasing amounts of reliable evidence suggest apparent advances in the Soviet's offensive capacity, notably in the area of multiple warhead technology.

Since the beginning of the nuclear age, approximately two decades ago, the United States has preserved an uneasy world peace by its unquestioned superiority in strategic offensive weapons. We have made it clear to would-be aggressors that any sneak attack they might initiate, however damaging to the free world, would invite an automatic response so terrible as to be intolerable to them. And our strategy has worked. Nuclear peace has been maintained. But we are faced now with a different set of circumstances. We are confronted with the realization that a potential enemy—convinced his scientists and engineers have built a practically perfect defense against retaliatory attack—need no longer restrain his belligerence and might in fact be encouraged to unleash a nuclear attack that would rain fire and death and destruction across the length and breadth of our land.

Clearly, the decision to develop and deploy an antiballistic missile system is a painful one for the administration to make, but it is a decision which must nevertheless be made, and made now. We stand once again at a crossroads in our efforts to deter a major nuclear war, and the decision to act cannot be held any longer in suspension.

So far the administration has resisted every attempt to speed up the deployment of an antimissile defense network, arguing that to do so would touch off the biggest and most expensive arms race the world has ever known. And, according to this argument, when the balance of military strength is again stabilized, on the new plane so expensively purchased, the world will be less secure than ever. Consequently, the administration has sought to end the arms and defense spiral through diplomatic efforts, through negotiation. It has attempted to persuade the Russians to enter into an agreement banning the deployment of antiballistic missiles by both the United States and the Soviets. But its efforts so far have been in vain. In fact, only 7 weeks ago in London, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin apparently ruled out a ban on antiballistic missiles.

I believe that defense systems, which prevent attack—

Said the Premier—

are not the cause of the arms race, but constitute a factor preventing the death of people.

Yet even if the Soviet Union were to express interest in such an agreement, the agreement itself must be suspect. Surely, the Soviet Union will not enter into an accord that provides for verification and inspection, particularly when verification in this field would involve disclosures even more sensitive than those involved in inspection of thermonuclear explosions. And, from the standpoint of the security of the free world, an agreement without verification is totally unacceptable. Also, there is the important point that my knowledgeable colleague, the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND] raised when he said:

A piece of paper with the name of the Soviet Union on it is not an acceptable alternative to an effective ballistic missile system.

It is not that the distinguished Senator, or myself or the majority of American people would not like to believe the Russians and to take these agreements at face value. It is not that at all. It is rather that history has proven, by example after example, that Soviet officials will honor agreements only as long as they serve their sinister purposes to rule the world.

But even if we share the administration's opinion and optimism that Russia is interested in halting the arms race, that it will open its country to inspection and verification, and that it can be trusted to abide by the terms of the treaty, even if we grant all these improbabilities, where does that leave the United States in the face of Red China's growing nuclear threat? What could be more foolish than to agree with the Soviet Union on a treaty banning ABM's if it meant eventually facing a Communist China armed with sophisticated nuclear weapons and protected by an ABM system of its own? And Red China's threat as a nuclear power must not be dismissed lightly. Indeed, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara has conceded that the Chinese probably will launch a long-range, nuclear-tipped ballistic missile before the start of a new year.

Therefore, any agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. not to deploy a ballistic missile defense system would be of questionable value. To be truly effective, such an agreement must bind all nuclear nations; and there is little likelihood that China, given its present bellicose nature, is in any way interested in it

I am not suggesting the United States abandon its efforts to reach an acceptable agreement. These negotiations should continue. Yet the fact remains that while we agonize over what to do, and while the administration speaks hopefully of an effective anti-ABM system treaty, the Soviets are deploying an ABM system throughout the U.S.S.R. and, at the same time, are enlarging their offensive arsenal.

Reliable intelligence information proves that the Soviets' missile defense system is not limited to the Moscow area, as spokesmen for the administration have thus far insisted. Rather, the Soviet system reportedly rings several large cities and is stretched throughout the northeastern regions of the country, the corridor which U.S. land-launched missiles must travel to hit vital Russian targets. In fact, less than a month ago leading Soviet military leaders, including Gen. Pavel F. Batitsky, a deputy defense minister, boasted unqualifiedly that missiles fired at the Soviet Union would never reach their targets. While that claim doubtless is an exaggeration, it nevertheless indicates, or certainly implies, that some Soviet officials are convinced they could protect the most vital parts of their farflung territory from attack.

I need not remind anyone, Mr. President, that the Soviets never stopped to consult with American authorities before beginning to deploy their missile defense network. Unquestionably, they had previously concluded that the antimissile missile would in some way enhance their overall strategic military posture. Authorities are of the opinion that the Soviets' decision to start production on an ABM system was made in 1964, after they had time to analyze the results of their A-bomb tests of 1961–62.

It is worthwhile to remember that with those tests, which were designed in part to gauge the effectiveness of antimissiles at various altitudes, the Soviets broke a pledge to the United States by ignoring a moratorium on nuclear explosions.

But, however, the Soviets arrived at the decision to proceed, by doing so they clearly rejected the assumption that U.S. reaction to such deployment would negate its strategic importance, whether that value is viewed in political, psychological, or military terms.

However, it is in terms of the U.S. strategic requirements—not the Soviets'—that the issue must finally be resolved. It is useful, therefore, to examine the question of an antimissile defense system—Nike X—from the following three viewpoints: First. Would it save lives? Second. Would it strengthen our deterrent force? Third. Would it enhance our overall strategic position in a meaningful way?

As for saving lives, it must be acknowledged that the very best defense system man can ever hope to devise probably will be inadequate against a nuclear attack. And in this regard the ABM is no exception. But in light of the unavailability of a better defense network, and with full recognition of the fact that many millions more would die if left unprotected, the Nike X system offers Americans an element of hope—at least until such time as we can effect a change in the international situation or, better yet, in human nature. An adequate defense system is necessary because all men have not accepted the teachings of the prophet Isaiah who warned that lasting peace will come only when men "beat their words into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation neither shall they learn war any more."

In the United States alone, it is estimated that an ABM system could cut deaths from 130 million—the estimated number who would die in a surprise attack if no such system were in force—to 60 million—thus a saving of 70 million American lives. Such an estimate cannot be dismissed lightly. James Burnham, a highly respected military analyst with whom I mostly agree, argues against an antimissile defense by writing that there is no significant strategic difference between 130 million and 60 million casualties. And perhaps he is right—strategically. But Americans by and large have been conditioned by Hawthorne's belief that each and every individual is important in some respect, whether or not he is important strategically. Fortunately, the Nation's value system is not so disjointed that it will carelessly write off the lives of 70 Americans—to say nothing of 70 million.

No, we can never hope to save the lives of all Americans, or perhaps even the majority of Americans; but that does not mean that we should not safeguard however many lives as possible, within our capacity to do so.

As to whether the ABM system would strengthen our deterrent force, the answer is again an unqualified "Yes." No matter how good its own defense, no nation would be so foolish as to unleash an attack against another nation whose defense it could not hope to penetrate and whose retaliatory capacity it could not hope to immobilize. To do so, would be, at best, to fight a nuclear stalemate; at worst, to commit nuclear suicide. Conversely, if one assumes a relative balance in strategic offensive forces, and then introduces a defensive component on only one side, it is entirely conceivable that the defensive capacity might, in a given situation, swing the balance to such a degree that the favored nation would initiate a nuclear exchange, knowing that the damage it would inflict would be far greater than it would sus-

tain. Thus, possessing the same approximate offensive weapons as the Soviets, the United States is benefited by the ABM deterrent factor in two situations: either when we alone have such an operational system, or when we have as effective a system as they have. It is only when we lack the protection that another nuclear nations has, or thinks it has, that the true danger of nuclear war is maximized.

More significantly, U.S. military policy relies heavily on what has been characterized "extended deterrence"; that is, our strategic capabilities have a restraining influence on Soviet foreign policy generally. This vital role could be seriously, perhaps irrevocably, impaired by an effective, comprehensive Soviet ABM system. In the final analysis, deterrence is a state of mind, a euphoric condition that could lead a would-be aggressor, who is himself protected by antimissile missiles, to conclude he could support a more aggressive foreign policy at an acceptable level of risk. If he were correct in his assumption, the U.S. strategic position would be eroded; if he were wrong, a confrontation of fateful consequences could follow. But in either case, U.S. security—in fact, the free world's security—would be impaired. It seems to me that this possibility could best be avoided by deploying the ABM as one element of a comprehensive defense network.

This leads, then, to an analysis of the third proposition, whether a missile defense system would materially strengthen the overall strategic position of the United States. And here the answer also is "Yes"—it would. In this instance, the question is not simply whether an ABM system would save lives or preserve what one news magazine called the "balance of terror" in the world. Rather, the question is whether the Nike X would strengthen the U.S. strategic position to a degree that would enhance our foreign policy generally.

However distasteful the thought might be, the fact nevertheless is that America's greatest foreign policy successes have occurred during periods when the balance of strategic forces—geography, economic strength, psychological considerations, military strength, et cetera—clearly favored the United States. For, beyond their function as a deterrent to nuclear attack, the forces serve also to limit a would-be aggressor's freedom of action by posing an ultimate threat. And the true measure of superiority is the degree to which they limit or support other courses of action, military and political alike.

As I previously indicated, the United States has enjoyed a strategic superiority by reason of its massive offensive capability. And while this capability remains of continuing importance, its significance may come increasingly to depend upon our capacity to protect the Nation from nuclear attack, if for no other reason than to reduce the potential for nuclear blackmail. Conversely, the Soviet deployment of a high-confidence anti-missile-missile system might lead them to conclude, however, erroneously, that the balance of power had been altered in ways to justify foreign adventures, an illusion which could produce decisions damaging to our foreign policy interests and threatening to the nuclear peace.

Both Secretary McNamara and James Burnham, to cite two ideologies, argue that the best way to meet the threat of a Soviet missile defense system is to increase the Nation's offensive capacity, its deterrent force. Their argument is persuasive. Without question, our offensive forces must be strengthened, particularly our ability to penetrate a sophisticated missile defense. But we should no more increase our offensive punch at the expense of an adequate defense than we should build that defense system without concomitantly increasing our offensive capacity. It is not a "one-or-the-other" proposition. A strong nation, like a good football team, depends on a relatively balanced attack, offensively and defensively.

It would appear almost axiomatic that the United States must maintain a position of strategic superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. And while a potent offense is important, the defensive component of strategic forces will become increasingly important, not only as a means of neutralizing the Soviet ABM system, but also because a missile defense would strengthen U.S. position generally. In many situations, this defensive capability could provide the crucially important margin of strategic superiority necessary to the attainment of U.S. foreign policy objectives and to the maintenance of world peace.

It is for these reasons, then, that our Nation should proceed without delay to deploy the Nike X system and to undertake related damage-limiting programs—particularly fallout shelters. Such a move will strengthen our overall strategic position, contribute to our national security and save lives if the deterrent fails. It is the only prudent course.

No one can deny that the nuclear defense program, of which the Nike X is a major component, is very costly, or that the money could not be put to better use. But national defense was willed by our forefathers to succeeding generations of Americans as their first and foremost responsibility. And it is. I doubt very much that anyone who favors deploying the Nike X system would suggest that the Nation commit itself at this time to the entire missile defense program, whether it costs $10 billion or $40 billion.

Certainly, I do not take that position. I merely suggest that—while searching all avenues to ban defensive missiles through a negotiated treaty, as the administration is doing—the administration spend the money Congress has already appropriated as the first step toward a comprehensive missile defense program, should one be necessary. We cannot afford, either militarily or monetarily, to delay further the decision to begin. Secondly, I suggest that the President set a deadline for negotiating the treaty ban, and in that way provide the Nation some measure of assurance that the Soviets, who as I said are presently deploying their own missile defense network, will not use the period of good will to our disadvantage.

Undoubtedly, there will always be a basis for rationalizing the deferral of the ABM system—if for no other reason than to admit its need is to acknowledge, in effect, that nuclear war is possible. But failure to deploy the ABM, failure to take the first step, risks a shift in the balance of nuclear power with potentially fateful consequences. Yes, we should begin, leaving the question of "how big a missile defense program is enough" for subsequent determination. At the very least, we should begin by providing the only possible insurance against the failure of deterrence and by strengthening the overall strategic position of the Nation.

It is an agonizing decision for the President. But it is one that he can no longer afford not to make.

DMZ DEFENSE LINE

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have just read the first clearcut, detailed article on the possibilities of a mile-wide, fortified barrier across the demilitarized zone and extending into Laos with its terminal point either at Savannakhet or Thakhet, both on the Laotian-Thai frontier.

This proposal has been suggested many times as a means to really confine the war to South Vietnam and to accomplish the stated objective of air raids on North Vietnam, to wit: to stop the infiltration of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This objective, as we know, has not been accomplished because infiltration of men into the south has continued along the canopied Ho Chi Minh Trail, and I believe I am correct when I say that Secretary of Defense McNamara has stated that infiltration has increased.

In my opinion, a defense line along the DMZ extending into Laos would not only have the effect of shortening the war but I believe it could be done at less cost than what was originally anticipated. Furthermore, when we consider that at the present time there is a total of 1,200,000 allied troops in South Vietnam alone, it would appear to me that South Vietnamese divisions should take on a far greater share there, a greater degree of responsibility in defending their own country and should be the ones in large part on the defense line in that area.

While I am not at all certain, I am assuming that the Pentagon has given this proposal consideration.

Not only would such a defense line cut drastically, if not eliminate entirely, the infiltration of men and supplies from North Vietnam, it would also isolate the conflict to South Vietnam. It would be of great assistance in the maintenance of the neutrality of Cambodia, and it would place us in a more understandable position in the eyes of our own people and the nations of the world.

May I say, Mr. President, that this is not a proposal which originated with me, but I do think it is a suggestion worthy of consideration and to that end I ask unanimous consent that an article by

John Randolph entitled "A Fresh Concept: Clear Jungle Zone, Seal Out Hanoi Support" which was carried in the Los Angeles Times of Sunday, April 2, 1967, as well as in other newspapers, be incorporated at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A FRESH CONCEPT: CLEAR JUNGLE ZONE, SEAL OUT HANOI SUPPORT—MILEWIDE FORTIFIED BARRIER ENVISIONED

(By John Randolph)

SAIGON.—There is little disagreement that if direct support from North Vietnam could be cut off completely, the Viet Cong revolt in South Vietnam would collapse—not immediately, of course, but inevitably.

There are still some occasional arguments to the contrary, but they are not convincing. Whatever may have been the case in previous years, it is a fact today that most weapons, ammunition, critical supplies, senior officers and overall direction come to the Viet Cong from the north. It is hard to see how the Viet Cong could long continue against a reviving South Vietnamese government and the now really powerful American presence without this help.

Moreover, the Viet Cong now require direct troop support from North Vietnam, American estimates say that out of the total of 280,000 armed Viet Cong, about 160,000 are informally organized, full- or part-time neighborhood guerrillas, and 120,000 are well-trained and highly organized "main force" or "local force" fighting companies and battalions. Of this 120,000 hard core, the Americans estimate that 36% of 43,000 are North Vietnamese regular army soldiers, and that about 7,000 more of these enter South Vietnam every month to shore up the Viet Cong. It is true these are only estimates, but cut them in half and it is still a lot of North Vietnamese soldiers for what is presented as a local, popular revolt.

NORTH'S SUPPORT ESSENTIAL

Historically, also, the evidence indicates that North Vietnamese support is essential to the Viet Cong. The record of all significant "peoples' wars" for the past 200 years shows a revolt can hardly fail when it has sustained, significant outside help, and can hardly win without it.

There seem to be no exceptions to this rule, and it applies with equal rigor to Communist revolts as to any other kind.

Why, then, do the allies—the Republic of Vietnam, the United States, Korea, Australia and New Zealand—not concentrate on cutting off this support with their huge army of 1,200,000 men—most of it infantry—instead of bombing North Vietnam and increasingly chasing Viet Cong bands around the jungle like a man fighting bees?

This is a legitimate question because cutting off North Vietnamese support would seem to be the most simple, straightforward and certain way to win the war—and in the long run perhaps the quickest, too.

Up to now the allies, that is, principally the American military and political strategists, have hoped to win the war more quickly and economically and possibly with less bloodshed. This is by trying to stop North Vietnamese support by air bombing, to reduce Viet Cong fighting power by short, sharp search-and-destroy missions and to rally the South Vietnamese villagers by pacification, which means restoring government control and winning the villagers' active cooperation by improving their welfare with material aid.

Unfortunately, this strategy has done little more than arrest and partly restore the alarming declines of 1964 and 1965.

BOMBING HASN'T HALTED FLOW

Bombing has not been any more effective in stopping the flow of essential supplies to the Communist fighting forces in South Vietnam than it was in stopping the flow of essential supplies to the Communist front line army in the Korean War. Search-and-destroy missions became less profitable after the Viet Cong tested American firepower and have since avoided battle except when trapped or when the odds are right.

As for pacification, it turns out that the basic ingredient is ironclad protection so a cooperating villager will not get his throat cut at night by a Viet Cong murder and vengeance squad. Since this degree of security requires complete military superiority and occupation of the area, pacification has not moved ahead quickly.

So it is a good time to consider a new strategy, especially with all these 1,200,000 troops on hand and relatively little fighting going on. Sealing off South Vietnam from all Communist contact and support seems like a worthy project and one that offers the greatest assurance of success for the lowest possible degree of risk.

It might also appeal to President Johnson, who must feel very keenly the political need to get the war moving along toward victory more quickly than it is moving. This not only a reference to his own problem in the approaching 1968 election, but to a sensitive statesman's knowledge that the longer a war drags on, the more risk the stronger power runs of losing friends and adding enemies. If protracted war is good for guerrillas, as Mao Tse-tung maintains, then it is surely poison for the other side. America's problem and the President's problem go hand in hand.

The extension of a defensive position across the northern part of South Vietnam and into or across Laos has been proposed by Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield of Montana, who views it as a better way to stop infiltration from the north than bombing.

To clarify what sealing South Vietnam means, we can quickly throw out some distracting ideas and side issues.

1—If this were a simple old-fashioned war, a quick invasion of North Vietnam from the sea would be the simplest and easiest way to settle the matter—like Gen. Douglas MacArthur's landing at Inchon in the Korean War. But in this war, an invasion of Communist home territory would probably bring Communist China into the war directly and provoke the Soviet Union into some unpredictable but probably unpleasant reaction.

Instead of settling one war, you would wind up with two, or perhaps three. Invading North Vietnam seems quite out of the question unless there are some really major changes.

2—As for South Vietnam's 1,000-mile sea frontier, much work has been done to control it, but it is still somewhat open to gunrunning. But this problem will be solved automatically when the allied navies summon up enough excitement, energy, equipment and ingenuity to break down the remaining self-imposed restraints and treat the problem as a vital war measure to be pushed through ruthlessly, even if some fishermen have to be ordered around a bit. On this frontier, the enemy is not communism, but an excess of restraint.

3—The 500-mile frontier with Cambodia, half of it through delta plain, half through mountain jungle, is a genuinely troublesome Communist sanctuary and supply source. But it is secondary to the much more dangerous infiltration route through Laos. In any case, Cambodia is a political weather vane, and it may be that if the allies really start to win, Prince Sihanouk will start to be friendly again and clean up his neutrality. Even at the worst, this is still the second border to seal, not the first.

This clears the way for a discussion of the real problem—stopping the heavy Communist infiltration and supply across the northern 250 miles of South Vietnam's land frontier with Laos, and the 50-mile demilitarized but partly Communist-occupied zone separating North from South Vietnam.

INTENDED FOR LOCAL ACTION

North Vietnamese troops and supplies that cross the narrow demilitarized zone between Laos and the South China Sea are primarily intended for local action. The long-range support leaves North Vietnam at a point farther north, makes an end run around the west of the zone through the illegally Communist-occupied parts of the southern panhandle of supposedly neutral Laos, continues on south and then turns back and crosses the South Vietnamese border at various points in the very rugged mountain jungle along the northern 250 miles of frontier. This is the famous Ho Chi Minh Trail.

This frontier can be closed by two different tactics—by actually putting infantry along the border to intercept, fight, destroy and discourage the Communists or by clearing part of the jungle and building a fortified barrier zone that would let a much smaller number of soldiers do the job, with backing by mobile reserves for emergencies.

It can also be closed in two difference places. One would be directly along the actual demilitarized zone and the northern 250 miles of the South Vietnamese land frontier—a formidable task in view of the length and the terrain, but not completely impossible. The other location, much to be preferred, would start at the sea just south of the zone, and generally follow former Colonial Route 9 westward to the Laotian border and continue on through Laos (directly cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail) to the town of Tchepone, part way through the panhandle. From here, the remainder of the line could continue on to either of two Laotian towns on the Mekong River boundary with friendly Thailand, either Savannakhet at the end of Route 9, or Thakhek, 60 miles north. Either way, the line would be about 180 miles long—much shorter than the actual frontier line

However—and this is the key point—to go into Laos on the ground would require an important modification of American policy, and very likely there would be some consequences that would have to be forseen and prepared for

GUARANTEED LAOS' NEUTRALITY

In 1962 the United States signed an idealistic treaty with 12 other nations guaranteeing the neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos. North Vietnam violated the treaty on its first day, and has been violating it ever since by illegally occupying parts of Laos. The treaty foolishly did not provide for any clear-cut positive action (only consultation) in case of such a violation. However, under basic international law, the North Vietnamese violation automatically gives both South Vietnam and the United States an unassailable right to take equivalent counteraction. That is, if the Laotian government can't throw the North Vietnamese out and close the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the United States and South Vietnam have a perfect right to enter Laos, drive out the North Vietnamese, and close the trail themselves. This of course is common sense—a breach of contract either voids the contract or entitles the injured party to reasonable damages.

So far, the United States has not used this privilege except to bomb the Ho Chi Minh Trail without much result. But the allies can use ground forces legally whenever they want to. The Communists would put up a howl of violation since they have never acknowledged their own violations, even though the International Control Commission, the inspector under the treaty, has confirmed them.

More seriously, there is the possibility of more North Vietnamese intervention, and possibly ever Chinese intervention, since China shares some of Laos' northern border. At the least, North Vietnam might make its